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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The debate surrounding the death penalty has always been at the forefront of 
American politics. To some, the death penalty stands for the proposition that a 
person that has committed a capital murder should be equally punished. Others 
believe that the death penalty is a deterrent to would-be murderers. On the other 
hand, opponents of the death penalty argue that the death penalty is not a deterrent, is 
not a proper punishment, is overly expensive, and even promotes violence in a 
society that is already known for its overly violent nature. Regardless of the 
arguments for and against the death penalty, the death penalty is innately unjust. 
Recently, Illinois, for example, issued a moratorium on capital punishment after 13 
innocent men had been set free after having spent years on death row. The death 
penalty cannot be administered fairly, and there is no room for errors when human 
life is at stake. 
Just as fairness and justice are the main reasons to abolish the death penalty in the 
civilian sector, capital punishment should be abolished in today’s military. Recently, 
the Commission on the 50th Anniversary of the Uniform Code of Military Justice2 
(“Commission”) proposed several issues that require congressional review. Among 
the long list of issues recommended for review, the Commission posed the following 
question: “Should capital punishment be eliminated for peacetime offenses?”3 This 
article will answer the question in the affirmative and take it one step farther: the 
death penalty should be completely removed from the military’s jurisdiction.  
Part I will focus on the death penalty in the civilian sector of the United States. It 
begins with a brief history of and an introduction to death penalty laws in the United 
States. A critical examination of the primary arguments used to justify the death 
penalty follows this history and introduction. Part I next offers a brief overview of 
other independent reasons for the abolition of the death penalty. The conclusion of 
Part I re-emphasizes that the death penalty is ineffective, inappropriate, inefficient, 
and immoral and should therefore be abolished. After having concluded that the 
application of the death penalty is unfair in the civilian sector and should thus be 
abolished, the article will then shift its focus to the death penalty in the military 
sector.  
The nexus in arguing that the death penalty should be abolished in the civilian 
sector and then in the military sector is both simple and logical: if the administration 
of the death penalty in the civilian sector is unfair and unjust, it is even more so in 
the military sector because of its inherent unfairness.  
Part II of the article will first provide a brief synopsis of the military court-
martial system and will then highlight the major differences between the military and 
                                                                
2Nat’l Inst. of Military Just., Commission on the 50th Anniversary of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, Topics for Consideration, MILITARY JUSTICE GAZETTE, No. 86, Nov. 2000, at 
1. 
3Id. at V.A. 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss1/5
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civilian justice systems. These major differences will lead to the inevitable 
conclusion that the military justice system is inherently unfair and therefore leaves 
no room for possible mistakes when the life of a service member is at stake. Because 
the military system is innately unfair, this article recommends that Congress abolish 
the death penalty in the military. 
II.  THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE CIVILIAN SECTOR 
A.  Early Death Penalty Law in American History 
The history of the death penalty in the United States of America is longer than 
the country is old. In 1608, the first recorded death sentence in the British American 
colonies occurred when George Kendall of the colony of Virginia was executed for 
suspicions of treason.4 Since that time, there have been variations in the methods of 
capital punishment and the definitions of capital crimes, but one constant has 
remained: capital punishment has continued to spur debate among religious, 
political, and social activists.  
Soon after their formation, the British American colonies began to enact laws 
regulating imposition of the death penalty. In 1612, for example, Virginia enacted 
the Divine, Moral, and Martial Laws, permitting infliction of the death penalty for 
various minor crimes, such as stealing grapes, killing chickens, and killing livestock 
without permission.5 The Duke’s Laws of New York allowed capital punishment for 
premeditated murder, killing someone who had no weapon of defense, killing by 
lying in wait or by poisoning, sodomy, buggery, kidnapping, perjury in a capital trial, 
traitorous denial of the king’s rights or raising arms to resist his authority, conspiracy 
to invade towns or forts in the colony, and striking one’s mother or father (upon 
complaint of both).6  Throughout the colonial period, the death penalty continued, 
but limits were continually imposed as to which crimes constituted capital offenses. 
By 1780, Massachusetts had limited imposition of the death penalty to seven crimes: 
murder, sodomy, burglary, buggery, arson, rape, and treason.7  
Today, the limits defining capital crimes are even narrower than they were in the 
early days of this country’s history. Currently, 38 states have statutes authorizing the 
death penalty.8 The most common crime for which states authorize the death penalty 
                                                                
4Michael H. Reggio, The Execution: History of the Death Penalty, reprinted in SOCIETY’S 
FINAL SOLUTION:  A HISTORY AND DISCUSSION OF THE DEATH PENALTY (Laura E. Randa ed., 
1997), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/execution/readings/ 




8CAPITAL PUNISHMENT PROJECT, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC., 
DEATH ROW USA: DEATH ROW STATISTICS, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/DRUSA-
Stats.html (last modified July 1, 2001).  These states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
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is first-degree murder with one or more statutorily defined aggravating 
circumstances.9 As of January 1, 2001, 3,694 prisoners were on death row in these 38 
states.10  
Capital punishment is not limited to conviction only under state law, but may 
also be ordered for certain violations of federal law. On June 25, 1790, Thomas Bird 
became the first man executed under the federal death penalty.11 He was hanged for 
murder.12 Since that time, the federal government has used its authority to execute 
336 men and four women for violations of federal law.13 The federal government has 
not carried out any executions since 1963,14 in large part because federal death 
sentencing procedures in effect in the 1970s were declared unconstitutional.15  
In 1988, Congress enacted new death penalty legislation.16 That year, the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act reinstated the federal death penalty as a potential punishment when 
any person engaging in certain drug trafficking offenses17 “intentionally kills or 
counsels, commands, induces, procures, or causes the intentional killing of an 
individual and such killing results” and when any person engaging in those crimes 
“intentionally kills or counsels, commands, induces, procures, or causes the 
intentional killing of any Federal, State, or local law enforcement officer” either in 
furtherance of the crime or in any attempt to avoid apprehension, prosecution, or 
                                                          
Washington, and Wyoming. Id. New Hampshire is the only state that authorizes the death 
penalty that has never actually sentenced anyone to death.  Id. 
9See COURT TV, A LOOK AT THE DEATH PENALTY BY JURISDICTION, at 
http://www.courttv.com/legaldocs/capital/map/penalty.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2001) (state-
by-state summary of crimes for which the death penalty is authorized). 
10CAPITAL PUNISHMENT PROJECT, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC., 
DEATH ROW USA: SUMMARY OF STATE LISTS OF PRISONERS ON DEATH ROW, at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/DRUSA-StateSumm.html (last modified July 1, 2001).  
Eight of these prisoners have been sentenced to death in more than one state.  Id. 
11DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CTR., FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY, at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/feddp.html#statutes (last modified July 31, 2001) [hereinafter 
FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY]. 
12Id. 
13Id.  These death sentences were imposed after convictions for murder and crimes 
resulting in murder, piracy, rape, rioting, kidnapping, and spying and espionage.  Id.  
14Id. 
15Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding that statutes authorizing the death 
penalty and giving unlimited and uncontrolled discretion to the sentencing body are 
unconstitutional).  See United States v. Woolard, 981 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that 
the federal statute authorizing the death penalty for the killing or attempted killing of an 
employee of the National Park Service was unconstitutional under Furman); United States v. 
Cheely, 21 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a federal statute authorizing the death 
penalty for the use of mail bombs with the intent to cause harm or damage was 
unconstitutional under Furman). 
16See Dick Burr et al., An Overview of the Federal Death Penalty Process, at 
http://www.capdefnet.org/fdprc/contents/shared_files/docs/1__overview_of_fed_death_proces
s.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2001). 
17See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2001); 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1) (2001). 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss1/5
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service of a prison sentence.18 In 1994, Congress, as part of an omnibus crime bill, 
extended the range of crimes for which capital punishment could be imposed.19 
Approximately 60 federal offenses are now punishable by the death penalty,20 
including first-degree murder,21 genocide,22 civil rights offenses resulting in death,23 
espionage,24 treason,25 and trafficking in large quantities of drugs.26 Before the death 
penalty can be sought in any of these cases, the U.S. Attorney General must 
authorize such action.27 Between 1994 and 1997, 475 defendants were charged with 
federal crimes punishable by death; the Attorney General authorized seeking the 
death penalty in 75 of these cases.28 
B.  Justifications for the Death Penalty with Rebuttals 
There have been three general justifications for the death penalty throughout its 
history in this country: religion, retribution, and deterrence. With more than half of 
the population supporting the death penalty,29 these justifications appear to be very 
convincing. A closer examination of each, however, will reveal just how misleading 
they are. 
1.  Religion 
Justification for the death penalty has been extracted from the Bible. According 
to Abounding Love Ministries, a nonprofit ministry with the self-stated purpose of 
“shar[ing] the Truth” and “taking the Gospel of Jesus Christ around the world,”30 the 
                                                                
1821 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1) (2001). 
19DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CTR., FEDERAL LAWS PROVIDING FOR THE DEATH 
PENALTY, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/fedoffenses.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2001) 
[hereinafter FEDERAL LAWS PROVIDING FOR THE DEATH PENALTY] (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1995 REPORT AND FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY RESOURCE 
COUNSEL PROJECT). 
20Id. 
2118 U.S.C. § 1111 (2001). 
2218 U.S.C. § 1091 (2001). 
2318 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 245, 247 (2001). 
2418 U.S.C. § 794 (2001). 
2518 U.S.C. § 2381 (2001). 
2618 U.S.C. § 3591(b) (2001). 
27Burr, supra note 16. 
28FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY, supra note 11. 
29A Feb. 8-9, 2000, Gallup Poll found that 71 percent of persons polled favored the death 
penalty.  Mark Gillespie, Public Opinion Supports Death Penalty, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, 
Feb. 24, 1999, at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/p990224.asp.   
30ABOUNDING LOVE MINISTRIES, INC., WELCOME, at http://www.aboundinglove.org/ 
index.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2001). 
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Old Testament of the Bible defines 42 “death-penalty sins.”31 These sins include not 
only murder, but also failing to circumcise, eating leavened bread during a feast of 
unleavened bread, putting holy anointing oil on strangers, failing to keep Passover, 
stubbornness and rebelliousness, and false dreams and visions.32 Even more 
surprising is the ministry’s statement in response to its discovery of these 42 death-
penalty sins: 
China executed 4,200 people last year, verses [sic] 74 in the USA. China 
executes bandits, thieves, unsavory businessmen, and political diviants 
[sic]. We have a long way to go to catch up, but by implementing all the 
Old Testament sins, executing criminals as young as 13, and eliminating 
certain legal procedures and appeals, we should be on our way to catching 
up.33  
Certainly what the ministry advocates is an extremist view, but many others have 
also found support for the death penalty in the Holy Scriptures. Some religious 
leaders and followers contend that the Bible not only justifies the death penalty, but 
also even requires it in the case of deliberate murder.34 They find support for this 
contention in that Christ himself was put to death, man was created in the image of 
God, and God himself instituted the death penalty.35 Further, according to the Old 
Testament, “And if any mischief follow, then thou shalt give life for life, eye for eye, 
tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burning for burning, wound for wound, 
stripe for stripe.”36 In the New Testament, this “sacrificial expiation of guilt for 
murder” is abolished by the teachings of Jesus and by his own death on the cross,37 
where it is written:   
You have heard that it was said, “Eye for eye, and tooth for tooth.” But I 
tell you, Do not resist an evil person. If someone strikes you on the right 
cheek, turn to him the other also. . . . You have heard that it was said, 
“Love your neighbor and hate your enemy.” But I tell you: Love your 
enemies and pray for those who persecute you, that you may be sons of 
your Father in heaven.38  
                                                                
31ABOUNDING LOVE MINISTRIES, INC., DEATH PENALTY, at http://www.aboundinglove.org/ 
deathpen.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2001). 
32Id. 
33Id. 
34Dudley Sharp, Death Penalty and Sentencing Information in the United States (1997), at 
http://www.prodeathpenalty.com/dp.html (citing CHARLES CALDWELL RYRIE, BIBLICAL 
ANSWERS TO CONTEMPORARY ISSUES (1991); CHARLES CALDWELL RYRIE, RYRIE STUDY 
BIBLE, KING JAMES VERSION (1994); Exodus 20:13 (King James)). 
35Id. 
36Exodus 21:23-25 (King James). 
37U.S. Peace Section, Mennonite Central Committee U.S., Death Penalty (adopted Dec. 4, 
1982), available at http://www.deathpenalty.net/religion.html#T19 (last visited March 2001) 
(on file with the author). 
38Matthew 5:38-45 (King James). 
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A large number of Judeo-Christian religious organizations have denounced the death 
penalty, including the American Friends Service Committee, the American Baptist 
Churches in the U.S.A., the American Jewish Committee, the Christian Church 
(Disciples of Christ), Church Women United, the Episcopal Church, the Fellowship 
of Reconciliation, the Lutheran Church in America, the Mennonite Church, the 
Moravian Church, the Orthodox Church in America, the Presbyterian Church 
(U.S.A.), the Reformed Church in America, the United Church of Christ, the United 
Methodist Church, and the U.S. Catholic Conference.39 These churches and 
organizations oppose the death penalty because they believe it is inconsistent with 
their religious convictions. For example, the Fellowship of Reconciliation centers its 
opposition to the death penalty on its Judeo-Christian heritage, which “affirms that 
for the state to assume the power of absolute judgment is to assume a power that 
belongs only to God.”40 On July 21, 1960, Friends United adopted the following 
statement regarding capital punishment:  
Friends accept the Biblical teachings that every human life is valuable in 
the sight of God, that man need not remain in his sinful state but can 
repent and be saved, that God loves the sinner and takes “no pleasure in 
the death of the wicked,’ but longs ‘that the wicked turn from his way and 
live.”41  
The Orthodox Church in America rests its opposition to capital punishment in large 
part on respect for all human life and the redemptive nature of the Gospel of Jesus 
Christ.42 The Reformed Church in America opposes the death penalty because it is 
“incompatible with the spirit of Christ and the ethic of love.”43 The United Church of 
Christ’s opposition is based on its “understanding of the Christian Faith and the New 
Testament call to redemptive love, mercy, and sanctity of life.”44  
These Judeo-Christian religions are not alone in their opposition to the death 
penalty. Buddhism, for example, teaches that all sentient beings are fundamentally 
                                                                
39DEATHPENALTY.NET, RELIGION: STATEMENTS ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT BY RELIGIOUS 
ORGANIZATIONS, at http://www.deathpenalty.net/religion.html (last visited March 2001) (on 
file with the author).  
40FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION, AN APPEAL TO END ALL EXECUTION, at 
http://www.deathpenalty.net/religion.html (last visited March 2001) (on file with the author). 
41FRIENDS UNITED MEETING, STATEMENT OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (adopted July 21, 
1960), at http://www.deathpenalty.net/religion.html (last visited March 2001) (on file with the 
author).  
42THE ORTHODOX CHURCH IN AMERICA, RESOLUTION ON THE DEATH PENALTY (adopted 
Aug. 1989), at http://www.deathpenalty.net/religion.html (last visited March 2001) (on file 
with the author).  
43REFORMED CHURCH IN AMERICA, RESOLUTION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (adopted 1965), 
at http://www.deathpenalty.net/religion.html (last visited March 2001) (on file with the 
author).  
44UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, DEATH PENALTY (adopted 1979), at 
http://www.deathpenalty.net/religion.html. (last visited March 2001) (on file with the author).  
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good and that one should abstain from the taking of life.45 Buddhism fosters “an 
abolitionist stance on capital punishment” stemming from “a deep respect for the 
dignity of all forms of life.”46 
2.  Retribution 
Another justification often offered for capital punishment is retribution. 
Retribution is one of the traditional theories behind punishment. Retribution is a 
theory of punishment that seeks to justify punishment “in terms of [a] cluster of 
moral concepts: rights, desert, merit, moral responsibility, and justice.”47 The goal of 
retribution is to deliver “the just punishment, the punishment that the criminal (given 
his wrongdoing) deserves or merits, the punishment that the society has a right to 
inflict and the criminal a right to demand.”48 As one writer has noted, retribution is, 
perhaps, the best argument in favor of the death penalty if for no other reason than 
that the desire for retribution is understandable:  
The human community is saddened by violence, and angered by the 
injustice involved. We want to hold accountable those who violate life, 
who violate society. Our sadness and anger, however, make us vulnerable 
to feelings of revenge. Our frustration with the complex problems 
contributing to violence may make us long for simple solutions.49 
Retribution is voiced as a desire to make the punishment fit the crime; to make 
the punishment proportional to the gravity of the crime.50 In the case of murder, the 
theory seems to support capital punishment. In order for the punishment to fit the 
crime, however, ‘“the death penalty would have to punish a criminal who had 
warned his victim of the date at which he would inflict a horrible death on him and 
who, from that moment onward, had confined him at his mercy for months.’”51 If this 
understanding of retribution were adopted, it would likely never be served. Instead, 
retribution might best be served simply by the use of extended imprisonment, basing 
the term on the gravity of the crime.52  
                                                                
45Damien P. Horigan, A Buddhist Perspective on the Death Penalty of Compassion and 
Capital Punishment, 41 AM. J. JURIS. 271, 275 (1996). 
46Id. at 288. 
47Jeffrie Murphy & Jules Coleman, Crime and Punishment, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
109-24, 129-30 (1990), in LAW AND JUSTICE: CASES AND READINGS ON THE AMERICAN LEGAL 
SYSTEM 532-50, 545 (Dale A. Nance ed., 1999). 
48Id. (emphasis added). 
49DIVISION FOR CHURCH IN SOCIETY, EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH IN AMERICA, A 
SOCIAL STATEMENT ON THE DEATH PENALTY (adopted Sept. 4, 1991), at 
http://www.elca.org/dcs/death.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2001). 
50Hugo Adam Bedau, The Case Against the Death Penalty, at 
http://www.aclu.org/library/case_against_death.html#retribution (last modified Jan. 24, 2000). 
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The retribution justification for the death penalty presents two problems. The first 
problem is that, in action, retribution frequently becomes a cry for vengeance.  It is 
often emotional and simply ‘“a desire for vengeance masked as a principle of 
justice.”’53 The death penalty has, in many cases, become the government’s answer 
to cries of vengeance by creating the legal means for inflicting “personal payback.”54 
Capital punishment, in this sense, is reminiscent of lynching,55 which cannot be 
acceptable, for “so long as we have courts of vengeance, we will never have courts 
of justice.”56 
The second problem with the retribution justification is its unintended 
revictimization of victims’ families and friends. By focusing attention on the 
murderer, capital punishment provides little support for victims’ families and others 
affected by the crime. 57 In fact, capital punishment often makes healing more 
difficult for families and friends of victims, 58 which would seem to be contrary to the 
goals of retribution. The lengthy judicial proceedings that constantly draw victims’ 
families’ attention again to the murderer compound their loss and prolong their 
suffering. 59 In this way, the murderer has not received just punishment for his crime. 
Instead, his punishment has caused him, whether of his own desire or not, to again 
injure those from whom he took when he committed his crime. Certainly, we must 
avoid again making victims of these people. We could accomplish this goal by 
imposing alternative punishments, such as prison sentences, that could be 
implemented more quickly and that would allow victims’ families to begin the 
healing process sooner. 60  
3.  Deterrence 
Deterrence is another justification often suggested for imposition of the death 
penalty. Deterrence can be specific or general. Specific or special deterrence 
involves affecting the punished in a way that seeks to prevent future violations by the 
punished.61 General deterrence involves affecting others and seeking to prevent their 
possible future violation of the law by threatening them with serious consequences.62 
                                                                
53Elan Goff, Retribution and the Death Penalty: Barbaric or Just Desserts, at 
http://www.elanworks.com/retribution.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2001). 
54The Unjust Death Penalty of an Unjust System, REVOLUTIONARY WORKER #990 (Jan. 17, 
1999), at http://www.rwor.org/a/v20/990-99/990/death.htm. 
55See Stephen B. Bright, Keynote Address, Capital Punishment and the Criminal Justice 
System: Courts of Vengeance or Courts of Justice at Conference: The Death Penalty in the 
Twenty-First Century, 45 AM. U.L. REV. 239, 281 (1995).  
56Id. at 299. 
57Id. 
58AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE DEATH PENALTY, at http://www.aclu.org/library/ 
pbp8.html (last visited October 23, 2001). 
59AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: RIGHTS FOR ALL, at http:// 
www.rightsforall-usa.org/info/report/r06.htm# (last visited October 23, 2001). 
60See id. 
61MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 47, at 542. 
62Id. 
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Deterrence requires that the punishment be a “kind of price system of conduct,” 
setting prices that most persons would find “too high to pay.”63 The argument in 
relation to the death penalty is that “we need the death penalty to encourage potential 
murderers to avoid engaging in criminal homicide.”64 At first glance, the death 
penalty appears to be the ideal deterrent punishment. Clearly, execution prevents 
future criminal activity by those who are executed. A closer look at deterrence and 
the death penalty, however, reveals that the death penalty may not be the only means 
of achieving this specific deterrent effect. Furthermore, the general deterrent effect 
that seems by common sense to follow from imposition of the death penalty has not 
manifested itself: murders continue. 
Once a person has been executed, there is no possibility that the person will 
commit future violence in that embodiment. Of that fact, we can be certain. The 
concern, however, is that perhaps the death penalty is too drastic a means for 
achieving this specific deterrent effect. At one time, the death penalty was believed 
to be the only means for achieving this specific deterrent effect, “[b]ut nowadays 
first-degree murderers can look forward to life without parole if caught, which 
should in theory deter them as much as the death penalty.”65  
Popular opinion regarding the death penalty supports this proposition that the 
death penalty is an unnecessary means to obtaining specific deterrence when life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole is an available alternative punishment. 
A 1999 Gallup poll finding that 71 percent of the surveyed population supported 
capital punishment revealed that this support declined significantly when the option 
of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was offered as an alternative to 
the death penalty.66 Support for the death penalty dwindled to 56 percent when this 
option was presented.67 An attorney at the Baltimore Defender’s Office summed up 
the reasons for this change in opinion: ‘“[Life without parole] satisfies the need for 
protection of the community, as well as guaranteeing severe punishment.’”68  
In jury rooms around the country, the tendency has been to avoid infliction of the 
death penalty when life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is offered as 
an alternative sentence. In 1995, in Virginia, for instance, the law was changed to 
allow this alternative sentencing.69 That year, death sentences almost halved, falling 
from 10 death sentences in 1994 to only six in 1995.70 Similar results have been seen 
                                                                
63Id. 
64Michael L. Radelet & Ronald L. Akers, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: The Views of 
the Experts, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2 (1996), available at http://www.philosophy. 
niu.edu/~critcrim/dp/dppapers/mike.deterence. 
65Jonathan Alter et al., The Death Penalty on Trial, NEWSWEEK, June 12, 2000, at 24. 
66Gillespie, supra note 29. 
67Id. 
68Peter Finn, Given Choice, Va. Juries Vote for Life, Death Sentences Fall Sharply When 
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in Georgia, Indiana, and Maryland.71 The goal for jurors in these cases is to prevent 
the convicted person from inflicting more violence on society; and life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole gives them the opportunity to achieve this goal 
without imposing a death sentence.72 
The issues are not so clearly defined with the general deterrence argument as it 
relates to capital punishment. It seems logical that the threat of punishment by death 
would deter activity resulting in that punishment. This logic, however, apparently 
does not prevail in the world of crime. A recent survey of the top criminologists in 
the United States found consensus that the death penalty is ineffective as a means of 
reducing violent criminal behavior in the United States.73  
One of the main reasons that the general deterrent effect of the death penalty is, 
at the very least, questionable is that murder and other crimes carrying possible death 
sentences are frequently crimes of passion, crimes often lacking premeditation and 
design, or crimes committed under the influence of drugs and alcohol. 74 Further, 
those who commit crimes in general and such crimes in particular often fail to 
consider the consequences of their actions because the general plan is to avoid 
detection, arrest, and conviction.75 Thus, it is unlikely that one considering 
committing a capital crime weighs the consequences, saying something like ‘“Well, 
since I might get the death penalty for this crime, I won’t do it. But if it were only 
life in prison, I’d go ahead.”’76 
Statistics support the notion that the death penalty is ineffective as a means of 
general deterrence. In 1999, for instance, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported 
that once again the south was the region with the highest murder rate.77 Eighty 
percent of all executions occur in the south, but as these statistics show, these 
executions have little deterrent effect.78 According to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (“FBI”) Uniform Crime Reports for 1995-1999, states with capital 
punishment laws have higher murder rates than states without the option.79 For the 
five-year period, the average murder rate for states allowing capital punishment was 
5.5, while the rate among states that do not have the death penalty was 3.6.80 A 
recent study of the death penalty in Texas also concluded that the death penalty had 
                                                                
71Id. 
72See id. 
73Radelet & Akers, supra note 64, at 7. 
74Bedau, supra note 50. 
75Id. 
76Alter, supra note 65. 
77DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, FACTS ABOUT DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH 
PENALTY, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/deter.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2001) 
[hereinafter DETERRENCE]. 
78See id. 
79DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: MURDER RATES 
PER 100,000 POPULATION, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/murderrates.html (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2001). 
80Id. 
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no deterrent effect in the state.81 In fact, the study concluded that “the number of 
executions was unrelated to murder rates in general, and that the number of 
executions was unrelated to felony rates.”82  
Some studies indicate that the death penalty actually increases the murder rate 
because of what is known as the “brutality effect.” The following is one author’s 
explanation of and his proposed solution to this phenomenon: 
By killing a criminal, we are stooping to their [sic] level. We solve a 
problem by killing it. Then the average Joe sees killing as a way to solve 
his problems. We are resorting to greater amounts of violence with our 
system. . . . When the state shows more respect for human life by 
abolishing the death penalty, the average citizen will also want to show 
more respect for his fellow man and killing will be a less likely option. . . . 
“So, as they say, an eye for an eye policy will leave us all blind.”83  
A 1995 study comparing homicide rates in California for the periods 1952–67, when 
an execution occurred about every two months, and 1968–91, when there were no 
executions in California, found that the average annual increase in homicides was 
twice as high during the period when executions were carried out regularly.84  
A 1998 study took a unique approach to examining deterrence and brutality 
issues.85 The aim of the study was to determine the effects of capital punishment on 
rates of various types of murder, particularly stranger killings and stranger 
homicides, rather than on homicide generally.86 Although the study was inconclusive 
on the issues of brutality and deterrence, it did show “a significant increase in total 
stranger killings and stranger homicides not involving other felonies,” following the 
execution of Charles Troy Coleman on September 10, 1990, closing Oklahoma’s 
twenty-five-year moratorium on the death penalty.87  
Some people argue that these and other similar studies lead only to the 
conclusion that the death penalty has no deterrent effect and, in fact, has the effect of 
increasing homicide rates. Whether such is the case or not, these studies show, at the 
very least, that the evidence is inconclusive, indicating the possibility that there is no 
                                                                
81DETERRENCE, supra note 77 (citing John Sorenson et al., Capital Punishment and 
Deterrence: Examining the Effect of Executions on Murder in Texas, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 481 
(1999)). 
82Id. 
83Jake Ortman, The Death Penalty, at http://www.orty.com/ubws/infohell/essay.html (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2001) (citing Jimmy Dunne, How Executions Boost the Murder Rate, DEATH 
PENALTY EDUCATION CENTER, at http://www.abolition-now.com/executionsboostmurder 
rate.html). 
84DETERRENCE, supra note 77 (citing CENTER ON JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, HOW 
HAVE HOMICIDE RATES BEEN AFFECTED BY CALIFORNIA’S DEATH PENALTY 2-3 (1995)). 
85William C. Bailey, Deterrence, Brutilization, and the Death Penalty: Another 
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correlation between rates of homicide and the death penalty. Thus, the deterrence 
justification for the death penalty loses all meaning.  
C.  Additional Reasons to Abolish the Death Penalty 
Not only do the traditional justifications for the death penalty not support 
continued use of this irreversible penalty, but other reasons also support abolishing 
the death penalty. The following is a brief list of some of the other arguments against 
imposition of the death penalty.  
1.  Expense of the Death Penalty 
Capital punishment costs taxpayers substantially more than life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole. A recent survey by the Palm Beach Post found that 
Florida spent $51 million more on death penalty cases than it would have had to 
spend to prosecute all first-degree murder cases and seek life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole.88 The study also found that Florida has spent about $24 
million for each of forty-four executions since 1976.89 According to a 1999 report 
from the Joint Legislative Budget Committee of the California Legislature, 
“[e]limination of the death penalty would result in a net savings to the state of at 
least several tens of millions of dollars annually, and a net savings to local 
governments in the millions to tens of millions of dollars on a statewide basis.”90 The 
most serious problem caused by these excessive but necessary costs of the death 
penalty is the unavailability of these funds for other important social needs. One 
rural Washington county, for example, recently reported that because of anticipated 
death penalty trial costs, raises for county employees would be delayed, the number 
of public health nurses would be reduced by half, and efforts to update computers 
and county vehicles would be halted.91 Loss of funding for these and other important 
government programs is an unacceptable and unnecessary side effect of the death 
penalty. The cure is simple: instead of imposing death sentences, impose life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The money saved could then be 
allocated to other important government programs. 
2.  The Death Penalty Is Applied in a Racially Biased Manner 
In one of its earliest decisions regarding the constitutionality of the death penalty, 
the U.S. Supreme Court entertained arguments that the death penalty was applied 
unfairly and in a racially biased manner.92 The Court ultimately held that death 
penalty statutes, which grant juries and judges wide discretion in imposing the 
sentence, were unconstitutional.93 Despite the adoption of new, less discretionary 
                                                                
88S.V. Date, The High Price of Killing Killers, PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 4, 2000, at 4-5 (on 
file with the author). 
89Id. 
90DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, COSTS OF THE DEATH PENALTY, at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/costs2.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2001) (citing THE 
CATALYST, Feb. 22, 2000). 
91Id (citing ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 2, 1999). 
92Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
93Id. 
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death penalty statutes, race continues to play a role in the imposition of the death 
penalty. It is, however, the race of the victim rather than the race of the accused that 
generally plays a role in this determination. In Texas, for example, one who murders 
a white person is five times more likely to receive a death sentence than one who 
murders a black person.94 Further, between 1980 and 1988, Texas prosecutors had 
never charged with capital murder or convicted a white offender who had allegedly 
killed a black offender.95 On the national level, recently released statistics reveal an 
even more ‘“racially lop-sided death sentencing record.’”96 The statistics show, for 
example, that since 1955, 55 percent of 177 defendants facing the death penalty for 
having allegedly killed a victim of another race were black.97 Another 25 percent 
were Hispanic, but only 11 percent were white.98 Even in cases in which 
determinations of guilt and innocence are accurate, inequalities in administration of 
the death penalty are unfair and immoral. They prolong the racism that has long 
colored the history of this country.  
3.  The Death Penalty Has Sacrificed Many Innocent Lives 
The gravest problem with the death penalty is its infliction on innocent people 
that have become victims of political and judicial systems that pay little attention to 
their rights. In Illinois, for example, this problem has resulted in the exoneration of 
more death row inmates than executions of death row inmates since 1977.99  As a 
result, Illinois Governor George Ryan issued a moratorium on the death penalty early 
last year.100 A Chicago Tribune investigation into the death penalty in Illinois found 
the following: 
At least 33 times, a defendant sentenced to die was represented at trial by 
an attorney who ha[d] been disbarred or suspended—sanctions reserved 
for conduct so incompetent, unethical or even criminal the lawyer’s 
license is taken away.  
In at least 46 cases where a defendant was sentenced to die, the 
prosecution’s evidence included a jailhouse informant—a form of 
evidence so historically unreliable that some states have begun warning 
jurors to treat it with special skepticism.  
                                                                
94Richard C. Dieter, The Future of the Death Penalty in the U.S., at http://www.death 
penaltyinfo.org/dpic.r04.html# (last visited Oct. 23, 2001). 
95Id. 
96Marc Lacey & Raymond Bonner, Reno Troubled by Death Penalty Statistics, NY TIMES, 
Sept. 13, 2000, at A17. 
97Id. 
98Id. 
99Cora Thompson, The Illinois Death Penalty, at http://chicagonorth.about.com/ 
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In at least 20 cases where a defendant was sentenced to die, the 
prosecution’s case included a crime lab employee’s visual comparison of 
hairs—a type of forensic evidence that dates to the 19th Century and has 
proved so notoriously unreliable that its use is now restricted or even 
barred in some jurisdictions outside Illinois.  
At least 35 times, a defendant sent to Death Row was black and the jury 
that determined guilt or sentence all white—a racial composition that 
prosecutors consider such an advantage that they have removed as many 
as 20 African-Americans from a single trial’s jury pool to achieve it. The 
U.S. Constitution forbids racial discrimination during jury selection, but 
courts have enforced that prohibition haltingly.  
Forty percent of Illinois’ death-penalty cases are characterized by at least 
one of the above elements.101  
The death penalty is the most severe, most irreversible punishment available. The 
use of DNA evidence in the exoneration of death row inmates in Illinois and other 
states has saved the lives of many innocent people, often after years of unjustified 
imprisonment. These innocents who had given years of their lives for crimes they did 
not commit were the lucky ones. What we cannot and do not know is how many 
unlucky ones there have been, how many innocent lives were taken by the death 
penalty before the availability of DNA evidence. Even one is too many. Even one is 
enough to require abolition of the death penalty. 
D.  Time to Kill the Death Penalty in America’s Civilian Sector 
Despite its long history in this country, the death penalty is an ineffective, 
inappropriate, inefficient, and immoral method of punishment. It cannot be justified 
through religion nor can it be justified through vengeance disguised as retribution. 
The deterrent effect of the death penalty is minor, an effect that could most likely be 
increased with the use of mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole. 
Regardless of these historical justifications, the death penalty is still unjust. It is a 
lengthy and expensive process that also draws out the processes of healing and 
closure. Further, its application is often motivated by racial biases. Most importantly, 
however, the death penalty fosters the risk of killing of innocents. If the death 
penalty should be abolished in the civilian sector because of its many deficiencies 
and inherent unfairness, the argument for abolishing the death penalty in the military 
is significantly stronger because the military system is inherently unfair, and there 
should be no room for gambling with a service member’s life. 
III. THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE MILITARY 
A.  Brief History of U.S. Military Law 
In 1775, the American Continental Congress, under the advisement of a 
committee that included John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, revised the original 
                                                                
101Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Death Row Justice Derailed: Bias, Errors and 
Incompetence in Capital Cases Have Turned Illinois’ Harshest Punishment Into Its Least 
Credible, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 14, 1999, at 1. 
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Articles of War to more closely parallel the British Articles of War.102  The new 
American Articles of War were enacted on September 20, 1776.103 The American 
Articles of War would ultimately be revised four times before Congress, under 
public pressure,104 enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) on May 
5, 1950.105  
The UCMJ was drafted with the following three primary goals: “(1) [to] integrate 
the military justice system of the three services; (2) [to] modernize the system to 
promote public confidence and protect the rights of the service member without 
impeding the military function; and (3) [to] improve the arrangement and 
draftsmanship of the articles.”106 The newly enacted UCMJ provisions were 
especially important because they accomplished the following goals: created the 
position of the “law officer”107 (the predecessor of today’s military judge); mandated 
that attorneys prosecute and defend service members accused of serious crimes108 
(established the right to counsel); criminalized illegal command influence;109 created 
the U.S. Court of Military Appeals110 (now called the Court of Appeals for the 
Armed Forces); and provided the accused the right to remain silent.111 Public 
outrage, stemming from the controversial Vietnam War, ultimately forced Congress 
to revise the UCMJ once again under the Military Justice Act of 1968. 
                                                                
102EDWARD M. BYRNE, MILITARY LAW 8 (3rd ed. 1981). 
103Id. 
104Walter T. Cox III, The Army, The Courts, and The Constitution: The Evolution of 
Military Justice, 118 MIL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1987).  After the world wars, when millions of 
civilians had become service members, either voluntarily or involuntarily, the American 
public pressured Congress to reform the military justice system, whose punishments would 
hardly pass today’s 8th Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.  Id. at 10-
11. 
105Although Congress revised the 1776 Articles of War in 1786, they remained in effect 
until 1806.  BYRNE, supra note 102, at 8.  The 1806 Articles remained in effect until 1874, and 
those, in turn, where effective until World War I. Congress replaced the 1874 Articles in 1920.  
Id. 
106Cox, supra note 104, at 13 (citing Letter from James Forrestal to the Committee on a 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (Aug. 18, 1948)).  
107U.C.M.J. ch. 169, 64 Stat. 117 (1950). 
108Id. The current version is at Article 38, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 837. 
109U.C.M.J. ch. 169, 64 Stat. 117 (1950).  The current version is at Article 37, U.C.M.J., 
10 U.S.C. § 837. 
110U.C.M.J. ch. 169, 64 Stat. 117 (1950).  The current version is at Article 67(a)(1) 
U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 867. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (C.A.A.F.) consists of 
five judges appointed from civilian life for 15-year terms.  The court is an Article I court, not 
an Article III, court.  See Act of June 15, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-340, 82 Stat. 178-79.  
111U.C.M.J. ch. 169, 64 Stat. 117 (1950).  The current version is at Article 31, U.C.M.J., 
10 U.S.C. § 831. 
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B.  The Military Justice System Is Inherently Unfair 
As delineated above, the military justice system has different origins and 
purposes from those of the civilian justice system. Because of these origins and 
purposes, the system has also developed several unjust aspects that can affect an 
accused service member, especially if the accused is on trial for a capital offense. 
The following weaknesses in the military justice system support abolishing the death 
penalty in the military. 
1.  Article I Courts Grant Convening Authorities Too Much Power 
At first glance, the most obvious difference between the civilian and military 
justice systems is the manner in which their respective courts are created. Military 
court-martials are created under Article I of the U.S. Constitution, whereas civilian 
courts are created under Article III.112 This difference in creation has an important 
implication because, under Article I, courts of military justice are only temporary 
courts. Courts-martial are created by order of the convening authority under Article 
22 of the UCMJ.113 In effect, a court-martial is an ad hoc tribunal to which 
commanders may refer one or a number of cases for trial.114 This ad hoc nature of 
military trials gives the convening authority arguably unbridled powers and, in turn, 
permits injustice. 
In the military, commanders, not police officers or judges, order an accused 
service member into pretrial confinement based upon a finding of probable cause.115 
Unlike the civilian counterparts, however, a commander has probably never been to 
law school or had other significant legal training to understand the concept of 
probable cause. This lack of knowledge leaves room for a commander’s personal 
opinions and/or influence by the commander’s superior(s) to be factored into the 
                                                                
112In the federal system, Article III of the U.S. Constitution establishes the U.S. Supreme 
Court and empowers Congress to ordain and establish inferior courts. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
Congress promptly passed the Judiciary Act of 1789, thereby establishing such courts.  Act of 
Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. Likewise, state courts are established by statute.  For 
example, Illinois established its circuit courts via the Circuit Court Act, 705 ILCS 35/0.01. 
11310 U.S.C. § 822 (2001).  Articles 23 and 24, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. §§ 823, 824, specify 
who may convene special and summary courts-martial.  General courts-martial convening 
authorities are usually general or flag officers but may be colonels or their Navy equivalent, 
captains, who are in command of a separate brigade, fleet, wing, station, or larger unit.  
Special courts-martial convening authorities are usually colonels or captains in the Navy, but 
may be lieutenant colonels or commanders in command of detached battalions, separate 
squadrons, naval vessels, or larger units.  Summary courts-martial, on the other hand, may be 
convened by lieutenant colonels or commanders, but also by majors or lieutenant commanders 
in command of a detached company, squadron, or larger unit.  Stephen A. Lamb, The Court-
Martial Panel Selection Process: A Critical Analysis, 137 MIL. L. REV. 103, 125 (1992). 
114
“Referral” is “the order of a convening authority that charges against an accused will be 
tried by a specified court-martial.”  R.C.M. 601(a) (2000). 
115R.C.M. 305(h)(2)(B)(iii)(a) (2000).  The grounds for probable cause for ordering a 
service member into confinement are probable cause that the confinee committed a crime, that 
confinement is necessary to ensure the confinee’s presence at trial, or that the confinee will 
engage in serious misconduct if not confined, and that less severe forms of restraint are 
inadequate.  Id.  
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
58 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:41 
decision to arrest a service member. Nevertheless, because military commanders are 
expected to exhibit the traits of honor, courage, and commitment, they have the 
benefit of the doubt in making probable cause determinations. Even the mere 
possibility, however, of having less than probable cause in making confinement 
determinations is detrimental because this first determination is the proverbial 
snowball that careens down the military system’s mountain of unfairness. From this 
point on, the military system has the upper hand: for example; a pretrial confinee in 
the military, unlike one in the civilian system, has no chance to make bail.116 
In the military, it is the commander, not the law-schooled prosecutor, who 
decides whether to refer charges to a court-martial. The commander, called the 
convening authority when deciding whether to refer charges to a court-martial, has 
several options: dispose of the charges by dismissal, forward them to a court-martial, 
or forward them to higher authority for disposition.117 If the convening authority 
decides to refer the charges to a court-martial, the convening authority must first 
conduct an Article 32 investigation.118 An Article 32 investigation is the military’s 
version of a civilian’s 5th Amendment right to a presentment or indictment by a 
grand jury in prosecutions for capital or infamous crimes. Some commentators opine 
that the Article 32 investigation is a better safeguard of an accused’s interests than 
the grand jury indictment is of a defendant’s interests because the accused and the 
accused’s counsel are allowed to be present during the proceedings and may even 
cross-examine witnesses and present matters on behalf of the accused.119 This 
advantage, however, does not outweigh the fact that Article 32 determinations are 
only advisory recommendations. Unlike the prosecution’s lack of choice in a civilian 
context, the convening authority can ignore a recommendation to dismiss the case 
and pursue the case in a general or another court-martial.120 Once the convening 
authority has decided to refer a case to a court-martial, the snowball of injustice 
really begins to gain size and speed, for at this point, the convening authority 
exercises the greatest power: the ability to select the military jury. 
Despite the explicit exception language found in the 5th Amendment, the 6th 
Amendment’s right to a jury trial does not apply to cases “arising in the land or naval 
                                                                
116Francis A. Gilligan & Michael D. Wims, Civilian Justice v. Military Justice: In Many 
Instances, Service Members Accused of Crime Are Granted More Rights Than Civilians, 5 
SUM. CRIM. JUST. 2, 5 (1990).  Nevertheless, the author acknowledges that, unlike his or her 
civilian counterparts, a service member enjoys certain benefits by the mere status of being in 
the military—the confinee continues to be paid, receive benefits, and so forth.  Id.  
117R.C.M. 401(c) (2000). 
11810 U.S.C. § 832 (2001).  The investigation must include an inquiry as to the truth of the 
charges, consideration of the form of the charges, and a recommendation for the disposition of 
the charges.  Id. § 832(a). 
119Id. § 832(b). 
120Gilligan & Wims, supra note 116, at 34.  Cf. Meredith L. Robinson, Comment, 
Volunteers for the Death Penalty? The Application of Solorio v. United States to Military 
Capital Litigation, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1049 (1998) (suggesting that grand juries, unlike 
Article 32 investigations, are the conscience of the community).  Despite the fact that grand 
juries are often viewed as “rubber stamps” for prosecutors, the fact remains that service 
members are not afforded this constitutional right. 
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forces.”121 The random selection of jurors “from a fair cross sections of the 
community” in the civilian sector122 is completely absent in the military. Apart from 
the limitations placed by Article 25 of the UCMJ,123 which details who may serve on 
courts-martial, the convening authority basically handpicks the court-members. In 
determining which jurors to pick, the convening authority is supposed to “detail as 
members thereof such members of the armed forces as, in his opinion, are best 
qualified for the duty by reason of age, education, training, experience, length of 
service, and judicial temperament.”124 Ultimately, the convening authority’s 
“opinion” is given wide latitude and discretion.   
“Court-packing” a court-martial jury to bias the outcome of the case is 
considered unlawful command influence.125 In order to prove unlawful command 
influence based on “court-packing,” the defendant must prove at trial (1) that the 
facts, if true, are tantamount to unlawful command influence and (2) that the alleged 
influence has a “logical connection to the court-martial in terms of its potential to 
cause unfairness to the proceedings.”126 Once the defendant has satisfied this two-
pronged requirement, the burden shifts to the government to prove otherwise.127 As 
long as the government disproves the presence of unlawful command influence or, in 
the alternative, proves that the unlawful influence will not affect the proceedings, the 
jury will continue to deliberate the case.128 In addition to the power to personally 
select prospective jurors, the convening authority can also remove jurors without a 
showing a good cause.129 Further, even after actual assembly, the convening 
authority can still remove jurors with a showing of good cause.130 
                                                                
121Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).  See also O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 
258, 262 (1969); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 37 (1957). 
12228 U.S.C. § 1863 (1964) (amended in 1968, 1972, 1978, 1988). 
12310 U.S.C. § 825 (2001).  A commissioned officer may serve on any court-martial, 
where as a warrant officer (ranking below all commissioned officers and above all enlisted 
personnel) may serve on any court-martial except those in which a commissioned officer is on 
trial.  If an enlisted member on trial requests a trial by enlisted members, the convening 
authority must select enlisted members from a different unit.  Id. Moreover, if the accused 
does request enlisted members, he or she may not be tried by a general or special court-martial 
unless the enlisted members constitute at least one-third of the court members.  Id.; 10 U.S.C. 
§ 825(c). 
12410 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2) (emphasis added). 
125United States v. White, 48 M.J. 251, 254 (1998). 
126United States v. Biagase, 50 M.J. 143, 150 (1999). 
127Id. See also United States v. Gerlich, 45 M.J. 309, 310 (1996). 
128Id. 
129R.C.M. 505(c)(1) (2001). 
130Under R.C.M. 505(f), the MANUAL defines “good cause” as including the following:  
“physical disability, military exigency, and other extraordinary circumstances which render 
the member, counsel, or military judge unable to proceed with the court-martial within a 
reasonable time.  ‘Good cause’ does not include temporary inconveniences which are incident 
to normal conditions of military life.”  R.C.M. 505(f) (2001). 
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Ultimately, convening authorities enjoy broad powers that their civilian 
counterparts do not enjoy. In addition, the convening authority is often the 
commanding officer of many of the people involved in a court-martial (the staff 
judge advocate, the court members, and many of the witnesses). This type of 
authoritative influence over many of the service members allows for the possibility 
of “illegal command influence” as defined under Article 37 of the UCMJ.131 Yet, 
despite the Article 37 prohibitions, convening authorities continue to find innovative 
ways to influence courts-martial.132  
Interestingly enough, service members that allege illegal command influence 
seldom prevail. In fact, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has set a high 
hurdle for any service member wishing to successfully assert a charge of illegal 
command influence. Not only does the defendant have the burden to prove unlawful 
command influence,133 but the service member must also “(1) show facts which, if 
true, constitute unlawful command influence; (2) show that the proceedings were 
unfair; and (3) show that unlawful command influence was the cause of the 
unfairness.”134  
Moreover, military defense counsel may be reluctant to accuse the convening 
authority of illegal command influence. If the civilian world is sometimes referred to 
as a “small place,” the military is an incredibly smaller place. In the military, it is 
highly likely that the convening authority may later be sitting on the defense 
counsel’s selection board. It is no surprise that, to date, no convening authority has 
been prosecuted for committing illegal command influence. 
In summary, the ad hoc characteristic of courts-martial grants the convening 
authority (1) the power to refer cases to a court-martial based on an arguably 
subjective notion of “probable cause,” (2) the ability to deny Article 32 
recommendations not to prosecute, (3) the ability to select jurors using a highly 
subjective standard, and (4) an assorted array of other powers.135 One might want to 
                                                                
131Command influence in and of itself is not necessarily a bad thing.  When commanders 
and convening authorities, however, try to influence decisions that should be independent of 
command and convening authority prerogatives, it becomes “illegal” or “unlawful” command 
influence as provided for under Article 37, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 837. 
132See generally, United States v. Newbold, 45 M.J. 109 (C.A.A.F. 1996); United States v. 
Youngblood, 47 M.J. 338 (C.A.A.F. 1997); United States v. Bartley, 47 M.J. 182 (C.A.A.F. 
1997), United States v. Levite, 25 M.J. 334 (C.M.A. 1987), Unites States v. Sullivan, 26 M.J. 
442, 442-43 (C.M.A. 1988). 
133Biagase, 50 M.J. at 150, citing United States v. Stombaugh, 40 M.J. 208, 213 (C.M.A. 
1994). 
134United States v. Richter, 51 M.J. 213, 224 (C.A.A.F. 1999). 
135The convening authority has the following pretrial and posttrial powers: the ability to 
limit the defendant’s military-provided expert witnesses (R.C.M. 703(c)(2)), the power to 
grant immunity to witnesses (R.C.M 704(c)), the power to order an inquiry into the mental 
capacity or mental responsibility of the accused (R.C.M. 706(b)(1)), the ability to enter into a 
binding plea bargain with the accused (R.C.M. 705(a)), the power to withdraw a case from a 
court-martial to which he referred it for any reason before the announcement of findings 
(R.C.M. 604(a)), the power to disapprove a sentence in whole or in part, and the power to 
change a punishment as long as the change does not increase the severity (R.C.M. 
1107(b)(1),(c), & (d)). 
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go as far as to say that, if the convening authority wants to bury the accused, these 
broad powers give the convening authority a broader choice of weapons and 
ammunition than are available to a team of Navy SEALs. 
2.  Inadequate Defense Counsel 
In addition to the convening authority’s ample powers, the military justice system 
is plagued with another form of unfairness: military defense counsel are generally 
inexperienced, especially in representing clients that are facing the death penalty or 
life imprisonment. Because of constant rotations, especially early in their military 
careers, military defense counsels are generally inexperienced.136 Nevertheless, even 
experienced military defense counsel may be hesitant to zealously represent their 
clients for fear that overly zealous representation of an accused could adversely 
affect their military career, especially if counsel believes that they will have to 
someday serve under the very convening authority that had brought the charges 
against the accused. 
3.  Military Judges: Pawns of Authoritative Hierarchy 
Military judges are also susceptible to the pressures of serving in an authoritative, 
hierarchical institution. Unlike civilian judges, military judges serve at the pleasure 
of the Judge Advocate General and are subject to constant review by senior 
officers.137 Moreover, promotions and reassignments depend on these evaluations.138 
There have been several recorded instances in which senior officers have attempted 
to influence military judges.139 Whether or not improper influence actually occurs is 
irrelevant. The fact that military judges, without the protection of tenure, know that 
they must do well on their efficiency reports to be promoted and that those reports 
are inevitably issued by their superiors, who in turn have a stake in the very cases 
that the judges hear, presents a grave possibility of improper influence. 
Ultimately, the weaknesses in the military justice system have not gone 
unnoticed. The Commission of the UCMJ has suggested a review of each weakness 
                                                                
136Professor Spak argues that military defense counsel are inexperienced because most of 
them are fresh out of law school.  After three years as defense counsel, the Judge Advocate 
General’s Corps of their service rotates them out of their positions to be trial counsel or to fill 
some other legal position, such as legal assistance, and claims or administrative law, or 
promotes them to fill supervisory roles, such as deputy staff judge advocate.  Thus, Professor 
Spak maintains that military defense counsel have always been of a lower standard than their 
civilian counterparts because of their youth and inexperience.  Karen A Ruzic, Note & 
Comment, Military Justice and the Supreme Court’s Outdated Standard of Deference: Weiss 
v. United States, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV 265, 295 n.238 (1994), citing interview with Michael I. 
Spak, Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, in 
Chicago, IL (Jan. 14, 1994). 
137Fredric I. Lederer & Barbara S. Hundley, Needed: An Independent Military Judiciary—
A Proposal to Amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 629, 
653 (1994). 
138Id. at 629-30. 
139See generally United States v. Ledbetter, 1 M.J. 746 (A.F.C.M.R. 1975), rev’d, 2 M.J. 
37 (C.M.A. 1976); United States v. Carlucci, 26 M.J. 328 (C.M.A. 1988) (en banc); United 
States v. Mabe, 30 M.J. 1254 (N.M.C.M.R. 1990) (en banc). 
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listed above.  In summary, the military justice system is inherently unfair because (1) 
the convening authority is granted unbridled powers in involvement with the military 
justice system, 140 (2) most military defense counsel are inexperienced,141 and (3) 
military judges are subject to an authoritative regime.142  These sources of military 
injustice provide strong arguments to abolish the death penalty in the military; there 
is too much room for error when the life of a service member is at stake. Although 
these weaknesses are good reasons to abolish the death penalty in the military, there 
are even stronger grounds to do so. The next section will explain the military’s 
expanded notion of subject matter jurisdiction and the lack of proportionality review 
in capital cases and how these two factors severely prejudice a capital defendant. 
Before addressing those two concerns, a brief history of the death penalty in the 
military is in order. 
C.  Death Penalty in the Military 
1.  Historical Background of the Military Death Penalty 
The history of the death penalty in the court-martial system predates the creation 
of the American court system as we know it today. Before the American Revolution, 
American colonists had incorporated Great Britain’s Articles of War, which 
governed the use of courts-martial and the death penalty. Under the Articles of War 
of 1775, American colonists created a court-martial system free from British 
control.143 Like British court-martials, however, the Articles of War of 1775 
authorized the use of the death penalty. Under the Articles of War of 1775, the death 
penalty was permitted for only three military offenses: shamefully abandoning one’s 
post, disclosing the watch-word or giving a false watch-word, and compelling a 
senior officer to surrender his command to the enemy.144 
Whereas the Articles of War of 1775 permitted the death penalty for only three 
military offenses, however, the Articles of War of 1776 greatly expanded that 
                                                                
140Id. The Commission has delineated for review the following questions with regard to 
the power of the convening authority: (1) Should the role of the convening authority be 
changed in the following ways? (2) Should the court members be selected by a jury 
commission or by a random computer selection process? (3) Should Congress create an 
independent Courts-Martial Command and provide that decisions to prosecute be made by a 
legal officer serving as the equivalent of a “district attorney”? (4) Should funding for courts-
martial, including expenses for experts, witnesses, and so forth, be centralized in each service 
rather than treated as a budget item for convening authorities? (5) Should the convening 
authority retain clemency powers, both with respect to findings and sentences, or should the 
convening authority’s powers be limited? 
141Id. The Commission has questioned whether there should be minimum standards for 
defense counsel in capital cases. 
142Id.  The Commission has questioned whether military judges should serve for a fixed 
term and be subject to a separate pay and allowance scale not fixed by military rank or grade. 
143See John F. O’Connor, Don’t Know Much About History: The Constitution, Historical 
Practice, and the Death Penalty Jurisdiction of Courts-Martial, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 177, 185 
(1997). 
144Id. at 184 n.51-53 (citing Articles of War of 1775, art. 25, 26, and 31 respectively). 
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number to sixteen different offenses in which the death penalty was applicable.145 
These sixteen offenses included such military offenses as mutiny, desertion, aiding 
the enemy, and sleeping on the post, while at the same time incorporating crimes that 
were both military and civilian, such as striking an officer (assault and battery) or 
committing a violent act against any person attempting to bring provision into camp 
(assault, battery, or homicide).146 Even though these offenses could be brought both 
in civilian court or in a court-martial, however, the “Articles followed the British 
example of ensuring the supremacy of civil court jurisdiction over ordinary capital 
crimes that were punishable by the law of the land and were not special military 
offenses.”147  
For almost ninety years, courts-martial were limited in their ability to hear 
civilian crimes,148 but with the passage of the 1863 revision of the Articles of War of 
1776, court-martial jurisdiction expanded. In the midst of fighting a civil war, 
Congress feared that civil courts could not hear every case brought before it during 
wartime. Thus, with the passage of the 1863 revision, courts-martial were able to 
hear, in times of war, the following kinds of cases involving soldiers: murder, assault 
and battery with an intent to commit murder, manslaughter, mayhem, wounding by 
shooting or stabbing with an intent to commit murder, robbery, arson, burglary, rape, 
assault and battery with an intent to commit rape, and larceny.149 The force of this 
revision gave military courts-martial concurrent jurisdiction over capital crimes with 
civil courts.150 This change in turn allowed commanding officers to bring military 
criminals before a court-martial quickly and quietly without having to wait for or 
deal with civilian tribunals. 
By 1916, Article 92 granted military courts-martial jurisdiction to hear murder 
and rape cases not only in times of war, but also in times of peace if the criminal 
offense took place outside of the continental United States.151 For thirty-six years, 
court-martial jurisdiction remained the same. With the inception of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice, however, court-martial jurisdiction saw its biggest 
expansion. 
Whereas the 1916 Articles had not given court-martial jurisdiction over rape and 
murder during peacetime, the UCMJ removed this restriction, thus allowing courts-
                                                                
145Id. at 185. 
146Id. (citing Article of War of 1776, art. 5 and 11 respectively).  
147Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 752 (1996). 
148Court-martials were only limited if a petition was made by a civilian to remove the case 
from military jurisdiction and to try the case in a civilian court.  Under the Articles of War of 
1776, the commanding officer was required to turn over military personnel in violation of a 
civilian crime.  If, however, no petition was made on behalf of the injured party, then the 
military court-martial could proceed with action against the individual. 
149O’Connor, supra note 143, at 190-91 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 75, § 30, 12 Stat. 
731, 736). 
150See Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 513 (1878) (holding that the 1863 revision did 
not give military courts-martial exclusive jurisdiction but rather created concurrent jurisdiction 
with federal and state courts). 
151See Articles of War of 1916, ch. 418, § 3, Arts. 92-93, 39 Stat. 664. 
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martial to hear all capital crimes regardless of peacetime or wartime.152 Further, the 
UCMJ required that all murder offenses be tried as capital offenses if the underlying 
felony was actual or attempted burglary, sodomy, rape, robbery, or aggravated 
arson.153 In addition, the UCMJ allowed for the expansion of personal jurisdiction in 
a court-martial. Before the UCMJ, military courts-martial had been able to reach 
only active duty service members, but the UCMJ permitted personal jurisdiction over 
“dependents accompanying an armed force” outside of the United States and also 
“discharged service members for serious crimes” in cases in which those crimes 
could not be argued, for one reason or another, in civilian court.154 The U.S. Supreme 
Court, however, narrowed the ability of Congress to expand court-martial personal 
jurisdiction.155 
Following the same desire to limit the ability of Congress to expand court-martial 
personal jurisdiction, in O’Callahan v. Parker,156 the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
Congress lacked the constitutional power under Article I to create personal 
jurisdiction regardless of the accused’s military service.157 Military courts, however, 
had difficulty applying the reasoning behind O’Callahan, and the case was highly 
criticized.158 Eighteen years later, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled O’Callahan.159 
In Solorio v. United States, a member of the coastguard was charged with 
sexually molesting two young girls who were the daughters of two fellow 
guardsmen.160 The offenses occurred in a civilian community where Solorio lived 
and not in the course of his military duty. 161 Nevertheless, Solorio was brought 
before a court-martial, where he questioned the jurisdiction of the proceeding.162 The 
case went to the U.S. Supreme Court, where the Court pointed to the military courts’ 
difficulty in applying the service-connection standard set forth in O’Callahan as a 
primary reasoning for overturning the case.163 Thus, the Court returned to the pre-
O’Callahan status-based test and dismissed the notion of the service-connection.164 
                                                                
152See O’Connor, supra note 143, at 196 (citing Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, arts. 118, 
120, 64 Stat. 107, 140). 
153Id. (citing art. 118 (4)). 
154Id. at 197.  
155See McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 284, (1960); Grisham v. 
Hagan, 361 U.S. 278, 280 (1960). 
156395 U.S. 258 (1969). 
157See O’Connor, supra note 143, at 198.  
158Id. at 199. Although O’Callahan attempted to create a service-connection standard to 
limit personal jurisdiction, courts-martial used a very low standard of the service-connection 
test that, in its application, appeared to go against O’Callahan’s holding. 
159See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987). 
160Id. at 436. 
161Id. at 437. 
162Id. 
163Robinson, supra note 120, at 1053. 
164See O’Connor, supra note 143, at 200. 
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The result of Solorio created jurisdiction over the accused based only on the status of 
the accused as an active service member.165 After Solorio, however, the question of 
whether this status-based test applied to capital crimes remained unanswered.166 The 
Court in Solorio had not addressed the issue because the case before the Court did 
not involve a capital crime.  
The dissent in Solorio focused on the rights of the individuals regardless of their 
status as service members.167 Although Congress had the power under Article I to 
extend jurisdiction to courts-martial, according to the dissent, Congress did not have 
the power to deprive individuals of their safeguards under the Bill of Rights.168 
Nevertheless, the question of military status versus service-connection in capital 
crimes remained unanswered, and the Court did not address another military capital 
case for nine years.169 
In Loving, petitioner Dwight Loving, an Army private, had allegedly murdered 
two taxicab drivers.170 Loving had also apparently attempted to murder a third 
taxicab driver, but the driver escaped. 171 The next day, Loving was arrested and 
confessed to the murders.172 After trial, a court-martial found Loving guilty of 
premeditated murder and felony murder and sentenced him to death.173 The U.S. 
Army Court of Military Review and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
affirmed.174  
On hearing the case, the U.S. Supreme Court in Loving did not directly address 
the status-based test versus the service-connection test, but rather the issue dealt with 
whether the President, under the Constitution, had the authority to prescribe 
aggravating factors for capital offenses.175 Justice Stevens, however, in concurrence, 
raised the question as to whether a service-connection test should apply in capital 
cases.176 Without even arguing whether a service-connection test should apply, 
Stevens merely stated that, “[o]n these facts, this does not appear to be a case in 
which the petitioner could appropriately have raised the question whether the holding 
in Solorio v. United States should be extended to reach imposition of the death 
                                                                
165Id.  
166The Court never directly addressed whether the status-based test applied to capital 
crimes although the authorities cited in Solorio differentiated between capital and noncapital 
offenses. 
167Solorio, 483 U.S. at 453 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
168Id. 
169Loving, 517 U.S. at 748. 




174Loving, 517 U.S. at 751. 
175Id.  
176Id. at 774 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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penalty for an offense that did not have the ‘service-connection’ required.”177  Justice 
Stevens appears, however, to favor overruling Solorio because “Solorio’s review of 
the historical materials would seem to undermine any contention that military 
tribunal’s power to try capital offense must be as broad as its power to try noncapital 
ones.”178 Although Justice Stevens joined in the majority’s decision, the concurrence 
rested on the “proposition that our decision in Solorio must be understood [not] to 
apply to capital offenses.”179 
Thus, the exact extent of the death penalty in the military court-martial system is 
still unknown. The question of whether there should even be a death penalty remains 
buried, but the question of whether the service-connection test or active status-based 
test applies to capital cases remains in the forefront and unanswered. History has 
shown the willingness on the part of Congress to expand personal and subject matter 
jurisdiction to courts-martial so much that it does not appear inconceivable that a 
court-martial could reach service members solely on their status of being in the 
military. 
2.  Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
Since the inception of the American court-martial system, the use of the death 
penalty has remained constant. The lengths to which the court-martial system could 
reach, however, to bring an individual before it have been the topic of great debate as 
the evolution of the system has turned toward an expansive notion.180 Thus, the use 
of the death penalty in the court-martial system has not been an issue of direct 
debate, outside of typical 8th Amendment violations argued in the civil systems, but 
rather the concern is the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in the court-martial 
system. Primarily, the focus has been on the distinction of crimes committed during 
peacetime versus during wartime, military versus civilian offenses, and active status 
versus service-connection.181 
The first example of congressional expansion in the subject matter jurisdiction of 
the court-martial system appears in the distinction between capital offenses 
committed during peacetime and those during wartime. Until 1950, court-martial 
jurisdiction was limited only to those capital crimes committed during wartime.182 
The understanding behind pre-1950 jurisdiction was that, in time of war, criminal 
conduct by a soldier needed immediate attention and the military system should not 
have to wait for a civilian tribunal to address the offense.183 On the other hand, in 
times of peace, access to the civilian courts was accomplished easily, and the 
argument of swift action needed during war did not apply.184 With the passage of the 
                                                                
177Id. 
178Id. 
179Loving, 517 U.S. at 775. 
180Id. at 752. 
181See Robinson, supra note 120, at 1050 (citing Enrollment Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 75, § 
30, 12 Stat. 731, 736 (1863) (current version at 10 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994)). 
182See id. 
183See Loving, 517 U.S at 750. 
184See id. 
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UCMJ in 1950, however, Congress expanded the jurisdiction of military courts-
martial, enabling the courts-martial system to hear capital cases regardless of the 
nation’s status of being at war or at peace.185 
Disregarding the distinction between peacetime and wartime brought with it 
disregarding the distinction between military crimes and civilian offenses. Before the 
UCMJ, military courts-martial were to adhere to “turnover provisions” brought by 
civilian victims.186 The turnover provisions, enacted in the Articles of War of 1776, 
required a commanding officer to turnover or deliver a soldier upon the application 
of the victim or a party representing the victim.187 The assumed reasoning behind the 
“turnover provisions” was not the belief that the civilian court system was better than 
the military court-martial system or that the rights of the accused would be better 
represented in the civilian court system, but rather, the fear was the use of a military 
tribunal as a shield to protect soldiers.188 Nevertheless, Congress, with the adoption 
of the UCMJ, disregarded the “turnover provisions” and permitted courts-martial to 
hear cases regardless of where or when the criminal act occurred.189  
Before 1950, a court-martial could hear capital offenses only in times of war, but 
the passage of the UCMJ gave the court-martial system an expanded notion of 
subject matter jurisdiction, allowing the system to hear capital crimes in times of 
peace without interference from civilians or civilian tribunals. The only question that 
remains is who can be brought before the court-martial? Although the question, for 
all intents and purposes, remains unanswered, the U.S. Supreme Court appears to 
have an expanded notion of jurisdiction to allow a service member to be brought 
before a military court-martial based only on the accused’s status as a member of the 
Armed Forces.190 After the inception of the UCMJ, the U.S. Supreme Court did 
address the subject matter jurisdiction of a military court-martial.191 The Court 
favored a narrow interpretation of subject matter jurisdiction in a court-martial 
system.192 The Court continued its narrow application by requiring that status as a 
military member alone did not give a court-martial jurisdiction.193 Rather, before any 
courts-martial could establish jurisdiction, there needed to be a service-connection 
between the accused and the accused’s duty with the military.194 The narrow 
                                                                
185See Robinson, supra note 120, at 1051. 
186O’Connor, supra note 143, at 197. 
187Id. at 187. 
188See id. at 188. 
189See Loving, 517 U.S. at 753. 
190Id. at 753. 
191See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22 (1955). 
192See Toth, 350 U.S. at 22 (holding that a court-martial lacked jurisdiction over a 
discharged service member who had committed the offense during active duty).  In addressing 
the question, the Toth majority believed that court-martial jurisdiction should be limited to 
“the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.”  Id. at 23 (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 
519 U.S. 204, 230 (1821)). 
193See O’Callahan, 395 U.S. at 267. 
194See id. 
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interpretation of court-martial subject matter jurisdiction did not last, however, and 
eighteen years later, the interpretation expanded.195 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court did not directly address the issue of capital 
crimes and subject matter jurisdiction, Solorio can be read as a warning that, if the 
issue comes before the Court, Solorio will apply.196 In Solorio, the Court focused on 
the accused’s status as an active duty service member and did not focus on whether 
the accused had performed the criminal act while performing a service for the Armed 
Forces.197 The majority further focused on congressional plenary power to give 
Article I courts, such as courts-martial, expansive subject matter jurisdiction.198 Thus, 
although Solorio did not directly deal with a capital case, the Court’s expanded 
interpretation of subject matter jurisdiction and its use of the status-based test, made 
it appear as though the same application would occur in a capital case.199 
The only other opportunity for the U.S. Supreme Court to hear a military capital 
case did not involve an issue in which the question of status versus service could be 
addressed.200 In Loving, the issue did not address court-martial subject matter 
jurisdiction, but rather whether the President had authority under the Constitution to 
prescribe aggravating factors so that a service member could be sentenced to 
death.201 In fact, the majority did not even mention the terms “status-based test” or 
“service-connection test.”202 The terms “status” and “service-connection” first 
appeared only in a concurring opinion.203 Justice Stevens, in concurrence, questioned 
whether a service-connection requirement should be used in capital cases because the 
question still remained answered after Solorio.204 Even though Justice Stevens 
concurred in Loving,205 it is clear that Stevens would require a service-connection 
standard for death penalty cases because “men and women of the Armed Forces do 
not by reasoning of serving their country receive less protection that the Constitution 
provides.”206  
Thus, until the U.S. Supreme Court directly addresses the issue of status versus 
service-connection, the extent of jurisdictional reach of the court-marital system will 
                                                                
195Solorio, 483 U.S. at 436. 
196See Robinson, supra note 120, at 1053. 
197Solorio, 483 U.S. at 439. 
198Id. at 441. 
199See O’Connor, supra note 143, at 198. 
200See Loving, 517 U.S. at 756. 
201Id. at 751. 
202Id. at 748-74. 
203Id. at 774. 
204See id. 
205The concurrence by Justice Stevens is based on his belief that, even if the status-based 
versus the service-connection test were to be argued in the instant case, the criminal defendant 
would lose because his actions would nevertheless fit under the service-connection test, and 
the court-martial system would still have jurisdiction to hear the case. Loving, 517 U.S. at 774. 
206Id. 
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be unknown. If history is a key to the future, however, then the willingness of 
Congress to expand jurisdiction under Article I and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
willingness to uphold such expansion leave little doubt that court-martial jurisdiction 
will reach to individuals merely because they are in the military. 
3.  Lack of Proportionality Review 
In the civilian sector, courts review the death penalty sentence using a standard of 
proportionality review. This proportionality review, imposed by statute in some 
states and in others by case law, is a safeguard mechanism that allows the reviewing 
court to determine “whether the sentence is generally proportional to those imposed 
by other jurisdictions in similar situations.”207 In the military, “Congress has not 
mandated a proportionality review in the UCMJ much less legislated the scope of 
such a review. Nor has the President provided for such a review in the Manual for 
Courts-Martial.”208 The lack of proportionality review in courts-martial capital cases 
is all the more reason to abolish courts-martial jurisdiction in capital cases. 
IV.  CONCLUSION: CONGRESS SHOULD ABOLISH THE DEATH  
PENALTY IN THE MILITARY 
This article has set forth the arguments against the death penalty in the civilian 
sector, a sector that by its very nature has more protections. This article suggests that 
the justifications for the death penalty in the civilian sector are both arcane and 
unrealistic. Religion is not a good justification for the death penalty: several Judeo-
Christian religious institutions have denounced the death penalty altogether.  
Similarly, the idea of retribution as a justification for the death penalty falls short of 
its intended goal: the same goal can be achieved via life imprisonment. Moreover, 
retribution is plagued with two problems; it is a cry for vengeance based purely on 
emotion, and it has the unintended effect of re-victimizing the families and friends of 
the victims. Deterrence as a justification has a similar fate; the death penalty has 
little, if any, deterrent effect, and the general sentiment is that life imprisonment 
without parole satisfies the deterrent effect. Moreover, the overwhelming expense of 
the death penalty, the racially biased application of the death penalty, and the high 
rate of innocent persons convicted and sentenced to death lead to the conclusion that 
the death penalty is ineffective in the civilian sector, despite the precautions and 
safety provisions built into state statutes and the U.S. Constitution. 
If the death penalty is ineffective and unjust in the civilian sector, it is even more 
so in the military. In the military, the protections afforded to service members are 
minimal. The effectiveness of these protections is further reduced by the inherent 
unfairness of the military justice system. Because courts-martial are not permanent 
courts like their Article III counterparts, convening authorities, who normally lack 
legal training, are granted unbridled powers. In addition to the power to order pretrial 
confinement and the power to refer charges to a court-martial despite Article 32 
recommendations to the contrary, the convening authority also has the ability to 
personally select and remove the military jury which is sufficient enough to taint the 
military justice process altogether. Moreover, a service member is usually 
disadvantaged because military defense counsel is inexperienced. Further, military 
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judges cannot be completely trusted either, not because they are not honorable, but 
because they must deal in every case with real or perceived illegal command 
influence. Despite the aforementioned factors of unfairness, service personnel face a 
greater enemy: the mere fact that they are service members means that they are 
automatically eligible for the death penalty, whereas a similarly situated civilian 
defendant would not be. Further, Congress has not established a proportionality 
standard of review for military death penalty sentences. Without this standard of 
review, a court-martial need not compare the sentence at bar to those imposed by 
other jurisdictions in similar situations, thereby allowing the possibility of capricious 
application of the death penalty. 
The bottom line is simple: there is too much room for error in the application of 
the death penalty in today’s military. The fact that various presidents have commuted 
the death sentences of fourteen service members (since the last military execution) is 
a strong indicator that the military death penalty is not only unjust, but also 
expendable and unnecessary. For all the aforementioned reasons, this article 
recommends that Congress abolish the death penalty in the military. 
30https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss1/5
